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THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE OF THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEM OF MEETING COMPETITION
SECTION 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discrimination in
prices offered to different buyers of goods of a like grade and quality
when such discrimination would "injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them .... 1  Section
2(b) 2 provides, however, that a seller who has made a price discrimina-
tion may rebut the prima fade case thus made against him by showing
that the lower price was "made in good faith to meet an equally low
price of a competitor... ." Thus, a good faith meeting of competition
is an absolute defense3 to a violation of section 2(a) .4
149 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (i95s), provides: "It shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality, where either or any of the purchasers involved in such discrimina-
tion are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimina-
tion, or with customers of either of them .... )
249 Stat. 1526 (1936), x5 U.S.C. § 13 (b) (1958), provides: "Upon proof being
made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimina-
tion in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden or rebutting the prima-facie
case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation
of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission
is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, howeser, That
nothing [herein] contained . . . shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie
case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or
facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
' Various limitationi have been placed on the good faith defense. First, the seller has
the burden of proof; second, the price met must itself be lawful; third, it must be an
actual price which is met and not a hypothetical one; fourth, the seller can meet but
not beat competition; fifth, the lower price must be in reaction to a specific competitor
who has offered a specific price. See Stedman, Twenty-Four Years of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 196o Wis. L. REv. 197, 207.
'Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (isgx). In the Standard Oil case the
Commission contended that the good faith defense is not an absolute one, but that it
merely changes the procedural aspects, of the case. It claimed that all that need be
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A significant interpretation of the good faith defense was made in
the recent case of San Oil Co. v. FTC.5  Sun Oil Company, a large
domestic oil and gasoline supplier, marketed its product through thirty-
eight retail outlets in the Jacksonville, Florida area, all of which were
either independently owned or leased from the company. One of Sun's
independent dealers, McLean, encountered competition from a nearby
station owned and operated by Super-Test, a vertically integrated
supplier-retailer. Immediately after opening the station, Super-Test
began cutting prices and McLean lost sales. After four months of
steady losses the Sun Oil Company gave McLean a price allowance
which enabled him to lower his price and still maintain a reasonable
margin of profit. This allowance was not given to the other Sun
dealers in the area with whom McLean was found to be in competition. 6
Suit was brought by the Federal Trade Commission against Sun Oil
Company for violation of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and
Sun pleaded the good faith defense of section 2(b).
The Commission issued a cease and desist order against Sun, ruling
that the good faith defense was not available to a supplier who lowered
his price to one of several buyers in a competitive area to permit that
shown is a discrimination in price and thereupon the burden shifts to the defendant,
who by making a showing of good faith could shift the burden back to the Commis-
sion. The Commission could then show an injury to competition which would negate
the contention of good faith by the defendant. The Court refused to accept this
interpretation and held that good faith is an absolute defense.
After this decision was handed down, Congressman Patman and Senator Kefauver
attempted to have Congress amend the act along the lines of the Commission's argument.
H.R. 1840, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); S. is, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). The
House bill passed with only three dissenting votes. 1o CONG. REC. oo25 (1956).
Congress adjourned before the Senate took action on the bill. Speaking of this bill
Congressman Patman has said, "The intent of the bill is to accept the Standard Oil
of Indiana opinion up to the point where the effects of a discriminatory price reach
a certain degree of seriousness, but to put a limit on the good-faith defense, so that
it will not be a bar to a cease-and-desist order where the effects of the discrimination go
beyond this degree of seriousness." Patman, For H.R. z and S. rz To Strengthen
the Robinson-Patman Act and Amend the Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimina-
tion, 11 VAND. L. REV. 399, 450 (1958).
5294 F.zd 465 (5th Cir. 196i), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 984 (x962).
6 The examiner determined that there were four Sunoco dealers in the area with whom
McLean was in competition. Two of these dealers lost sales to the extent of about
14.5% each after the allowance was given to McLean. A third dealer's records had
been tampered with and consequently were disregarded as evidence to show to what
extent his sales were affected. The fourth dealer suffered no loss at all. In re Sun
Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959).
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buyer-to meet competition at his level of marketing.7 Rather, the good
faith defense would be available only to a seller who lowers his price
to meet competition at his own. level.8 The Commission suggested
two alternative courses of action which Sun Oil Company could have
pursued. First, Sun could have purchased all of its retail outlets and
thereby become a supplier-retailer free to set any price it chose. Or,
secondly, Sun could have lowered the price to all of its dealers.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the FTC and
held that the good faith defense was available under the circumstances
of the San Oil case.10 In so holding the court relied on the Supreme
Court decision in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC." In that case, Standard
Oil, in order to meet a competitor's price, lowered its price to certain
wholesalers in the Detroit area without a corresponding reduction to
retail dealers. The wholesalers passed this saving on to their retail
customers, thus enabling them to undercut those retailers buying directly
" The examiner also held that even assuming the defense to be available to Sun,
the decision could be based on alternative grounds. First, Sun Oil Company did not act
in good faith in that the price discrimination was made to beat rather that meet compe-
tition. There was evidence showing that Super-Test's usual price was two cents below
that of McLeans because, as a general rule, independent brands of gasoline such as
Super-Test are competitive with name brand gasoline only with the aid of this differ-
ential. Therefore, the examiner felt that the allowance given McLean, which enabled
him to set his price within one cent of Super-Test's, was beating competition. The
second alternative ground was that Sun Oil Company had entered into a price fixing
agreement with McLean. The examiner said that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding that, in order to get the allowance, McLean had to agree to set his
price where he did. In re Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 965-66 (1959).
' The Commission relied on Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., a case in which
the Texas Company had lowered its price to certain of its several dealers in the area
of a gas war. The price charged was determined by the average price of gasoline
in a dealer's immediate area. As a result, the dealers in town were charged a lower
price than one located on a highway at the edge of town. The district court in that
case found that the Texas Company was not in competition with any of the dealers
and thus was not meeting competition within the meaning of the act. 136 F. Supp.
420 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (ad Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 965 (s957).
'In re Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 965 (.959).
"oAs to the examiner's alternative ruling that Sun had not acted in good faith,
the court held that there was not sufficient evidence to show that Sun and McLean
intended to fix prices. A price fixing agreement may be established by circumstantial
evidence, but the court said that this does not relax the rule requiring substantial
evidence to support a finding by the examiner. Furthermore, the court held that
the evidence failed to show that Sun was beating instead of meeting competition. 294
F.2d at 482.
21 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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from Standard. The FTC brought suit against Standard Oil for viola
tion of section 2(a) of the act. In reviewing the case, the Supreme
Court demonstrated a keen awareness of the competitive situation in
gasoline marketing and said that the realities of economic life must be
considered in each case. Although Standard was distinguishable on
the facts, the Court of Appeals said that the same broad approach there
taken should be applied in deciding the instant case.
The court considered the Commission's construction of section 2(b)
unnecessarily narrow in that it would preclude a supplier from effectively
meeting the lower prices of its vertically integrated competitor.12  By
way of demonstration, the court pointed to the anomalous and eco-
nomically unrealistic results13 which would ensue if the Sun Oil Com-
pany were to follow the Commission's suggestions. If Sun were to
purchase all of its retail outlets, already highly integrated oil companies
would be forced to integrate still further, to the detriment of independ-
ent retailers. The act would thus become an instrument of injury to
those for whose benefit it was originally passed.' 4 Further integration
2 In the instant case the examiner felt that the good faith defense would be available
to Sun only if another supplier made a direct offer of a lower price to McLean. If
this had been the situation then Sun could have lowered the price to McLean without
a corresponding reduction to the other dealers. It would seem that a seller's need to
give a lower price is just as pressing whether the loss in retail sales comes from either
a direct lower offer to his buyer or the buyer's inability to hold his share of the market
because of competition from an integrated supplier-retailer. See Note, 66 YALE L.J.
935 (1957).
2 Indeed, the district court opinion in the Enterprise case had recognized the
economic unreality of this result. The court was fully aware of the competitive situa-
tion in the oil and gasoline industry. Where a filling station operator is selling a
brand-name gasoline, he does not buy from several competing oil companies. The
district court judge speaking of competition in the oil and gasoline industry said:
"[P]erhaps it is a fiction to speak of price competition at the oil company sale to the
station level." Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420, 471 (D.
Conn. 1955). The essential assumption of both the court in the Eptterprise case and
Commission in the Sun Oil case, is that although a supplier's products compete for the
motorists' acceptance, the supplier is not in competition at the consumer level. The
Commission in the instant case would extend the result to include even the supplier-
retailer.
1" The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted against a background of a growing trend
in chain stores which, because of their size, could coerce the supplier into giving them
price concessions not available to the smaller independent merchants. Thus the purposes
of the act were to secure the position of local ownership and to protect independent
merchants. Se. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
(1950) ; Ostberg, The Meaning of the "Injury to Competition" Provision of the Rob-
inson-Patman 4ct, 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. z6 (1957)5 Rowe, The Evolution of the
Robinson-Patman Act: 4 Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1o59 (957).
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would also tend to increase the monopolistic character of the oil and
gasoline industry, a contravention of the policy of the antitrust law
which the Robinson-Patman Act amended. 15 Following the Commis-
sion's second suggestion would spread the harmful effects of price wars
throughout the entire area of competition by requiring that Sun lower
its prices to all dealers in order to assist the one dealer who needed
help.16 Finally, the court sua sponte pointed out that if Sun did
nothing, the full burden of the price war would be on the individual
who could least afford it, the independent retailer attempting to compete
with the vertically-integrated company.
Although the Commission reached a result not totally unwarranted
under the existing language of the act, the result reached by the Court
of Appeals was the only reasonable one under the circumstances pre-
sented in the Sun Oil case. The defect lies in the Robinson-Patman Act
itself. By laying down an inelastic standard, the aat fails to recognize
the multiplicity of economic factors which may affect the competitive
situation in each case.17  As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, the economic
1 The act was passed as an amendment to the Clayton Act, the stated purpose of
which is to protect against the harmful effects of monopoly. AUSTIN, supra note 14.
The Commission's suggestion that Sun buy all its retail outlets would foster vertical
integration resulting in a concentration of more business in fewer hands.
"8 Moreover, even if Sun did lower the price to all dealers in the area, the court
recognized that it would risk being found in violation of the act under the prin-
ciple of FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (196o). In that case a
brewery had lowered its price in the St. Louis area. The Court of Appeals had held
that there had been no violation of the act, stating that "There must be some relation-
ship between the different purchasers which entitles them to comparable treatment. .... .
The court went on to say that competition between purchasers would create this needed
relationship. Thus there had been no violation because all the purchasers in St. Louis
were being charged the same price and those purchasers throughout the rest of the
country were not related to those in St. Louis. 265 F.2d 677, 681 ( 7 th Cir. 1959).
The Supreme Court reversed. Holding that the act might have been violated, the
Court said that the injury to competition need not be at the buyer's level of competition,
but could be found at the seller's own level. On remand the Court of Appeals held
that there had been no injury shown to the seller's competitors. TRADE REG. REP.
(196x Trade Cas.) 69,9o 4 ( 7 th Cir. 196i).
Given the Anheuser-Busch holding, under the Commission's interpretation of the
law, the effects of a price war could be spread beyond the area of competition. This
result follows because a nationwide seller, such as Sun, would have to lower its prices
throughout the United States in order to avoid the ruling of that case. BiU see Balian
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.zd 356 ( 9 th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 991 (1956), where the price of ice cream was lowered throughout the Los
Angeles area. The Court of Appeals held that Arden need not lower the price to
purchasers in other western cities and that the act had not been violated.
"See Robbins, Is Coampetitive Pricing Legal?, 35 HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec.
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realities of each case should be considered so that where, as -here, a
producer-wholesaler competes for the consumer's acceptance through
independently owned retail outlets handling only the producer's
product, then the wholesaler and retailer will be considered a single
competitive unit for purposes of the act."8 In this situation the best
business interests of the producer will cause it to strike a fair balance
between aiding the one dealer who needs help and not prejudicing its
other independent dealers.'"
Under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the "good faith defense,"
the FTC in future cases can go to the substance of the problem in price-
discrimination cases, considering the realities of competition instead of
looking at mere form. 0 More consideration will have to be given to
the competitive practices and customs in each industry', Moreover,
attention can now be focused on the effect on competition in general 22
1957, p. 83, 85. "The competitive impact clause of Section 2(a) can and must be
read to incorporate a rule of reason; otherwise the law cannot take into account the
many economic factors affecting the public's interest in competition. Each case
requires its own analysis of market behavior. .... "
" By following this broader approach of looking at the competitive realities in each
case one may find that different results occur within the same industry depending on
the circumstances in each case. For example, here Super-Test was a producer-wholesaler.
If the competition which McLean encountered had come from another independent
retailer acting on his own initiative, without aid from his supplier, the court probably
would not have upheld the meeting competition defense. Unless the supplier helped
the independent retailer by giving him a price allowance, Sun Oil Company would
have no competition on its own level. See 4ntitrust and Trade Reg. Rep., Aug. s,
1961.
"9 Another factor complicating the competitive situation is the presence of quality
as well as price competition. When people are buying shoes or automobiles, the quality
of the product plays a large part in their selection; in buying gasoline, where each
brand is about the equivalent of another, the price is the biggest factor in their selection.
Therefore, in the cases where quality is a factor, it may be much harder for the de-
fendant to show the need and the justification for having to lower the price.
"o The court in the instant case looked beyond the mere formal functions of supplier,
wholesaler and retailer and said that in the gasoline industry all of these are so inter-
related and dependent on each other that it is impossible to say that there is competition
at the supplier-to-dealer level. The substance of competition exists between suppliers
seeking the motorist's trade. 294 F.zd at 476-77.
"1See generally Robbins, supra note 17, at 83. The Commission has in one case
recognized that these factors should be taken into consideration. In Yale and Towne
Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. i58o (x956), discounts had been given to some but not all pur-
chasers. The defendant brought forth evidence to show the reasons for such discounts
and also the type of industry of which it was a part and how that industry operated.
The examiner did consider these factors and held for the defendant.
" In a competitive system each individual will necessarily be trying to divert the
business of his competitor to himself and thus, in the process, someone is inevitably
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rather than on the plight of individual competitors.2 3  The act as in-
terpreted protects against the harmful effects of price discrimination
while remaining flexible enough to give proper consideration to the
competitive conditions of the individual case.
going to suffer. See Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 6x HARV.
L. REV. 289 (z948). As Dr. John D. Clark, economic adviser to President Truman,
said: "All competitive effort is burdensome and harmful to those who cannot keep pace,
but if we said it must stop short before it hurts anyone we would abandon the policy
of competition." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, gist Cong., ist Sess., pt. t, at 113 (x949).
In Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (195x), the Court observed: "It
must have been obvious to Congress that any price reduction to any dealer may always
affect competition at that dealer's level as well as at the dealer's resale level, whether
or not the reduction to the dealer is discriminatory."
"This approach has long been advocated by eminent authors. See Carlston, Senate
Bill No. zi and Antitrust Policy, 11 VAND. L. REV. 129 (1957); Simon, Price Dis-
crimination to Meet Competition, 195o U. ILL. L.F. 575- "It appears that the
sponsors of the Robinson-Patman Act were not entirely aware of the paradox inherent
in any attempt to protect individual competitors as well as competition." Ostberg,
supra note x4, at 28. See generally Simon, The Fantasy of the Phrase "Injury to
Competition," x5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 258 (195o). The recent Attorney
General's Report also recommended this approach. "Consonant with these policies,
this Committee recommends that analysis of the statutory 'injury' center on the vigor
of competition in the market rather than hardship to the individual businessmen."
REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITr_. To STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS, 164 (1955).
[Vol. i962 : 300
